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Abstract 
The principle of territoriality is one of the foundational principles of 
International Intellectual Property Law. This principle allows countries to 
design their intellectual property laws in a manner that facilitates the 
achievement of specific societal goals. However, while it is true that this 
principle has managed to survive the incorporation of intellectual property 
into the international trade law system (via the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement), 
some scholars have expressed concern that the incorporation of intellectual 
property into the international investment law system via investment 
agreements (such as bilateral investment treaties) constitutes a potential 
threat to the principle of territoriality in the international intellectual 
property system. This paper will investigate the tension between the 
principle of territoriality and the global harmonisation of intellectual 
property standards in the context of the current iteration of intellectual 
property as an asset in investment agreements. Specifically, it will critically 
examine how this tension was resolved in two recent investment 
arbitration disputes. The first is the dispute between Philip Morris and 
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Uruguay which concerned the latter’s implementation of certain measures 
to curb the consumption of tobacco products in its country but which Philip 
Morris construed as an expropriation of its trademarks. The second is the 
dispute between Eli Lilly and Canada which concerned the interpretation 
of the utility requirement under Canadian patent law. These cases will be 
used to assess whether there is still scope for the preservation of the 
principle of territoriality within the investor-state dispute settlement 
system. 
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1 Introduction 
The principle of territoriality is one of the foundational principles of International 
Intellectual Property Law (IIPL).1 According to the principle of territoriality, 
intellectual property rights are limited to the territory of the country where they 
have been granted.2 The principle of territoriality permits states to tailor their 
national intellectual property laws to suit their level of technological and 
economic development. In other words, pursuant to the principle of territoriality, 
countries can design their intellectual property laws in a manner that facilitates 
the achievement of specific societal goals such as encouraging the development 
of home-grown industries or protecting public health. Despite increased 
globalisation and the growth of international agreements dealing with 
intellectual property rights, the principle of territoriality is still regarded as a 
basic tenet of IIPL. 
The principle of territoriality in International Law has its roots in the 
emergence of nation-states and this emergence is typically attributed to the Peace 
of Westphalia of 16483 although, as a concept in political theory, territory 
predates the 17th century.4 The history of intellectual property rights, at least 
from a Euro-centric perspective, is inextricably linked with territoriality.5 As 
                                                 
1  See, Hanns Ullrich, “TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition 
Policy” (1995) 4(1) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 153-210, p. 157 (noting that, “The 
international protection of technological property has been governed by three 
interdependent principles: 1) territoriality of protection; 2) national treatment of foreign 
owners of national intellectual property; and 3) international minimum protection.”). 
2  Lydia Lundstedt, Territoriality in Intellectual Property Law (Stockholm University, 2016), p. 91. 
3  See, Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” (1948) 42(1) American Journal of 
International Law 20-41, pp. 28-29. See also, Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia and the 
Origins of Sovereignty” (1999) 21(3) The International History Review 569-591; Lundstedt, 
supra n. 2, p. 28. 
4  See, Jean Gottmann, “The Evolution of the Concept of Territory” (1975) 14(3) Social Science 
Information 29-47, pp. 29-30. 
5  Lundstedt, supra n. 2, p. 122. 
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Lundstedt notes, “the origin of IP rights, in particular patent and copyright, is 
usually traced back to the privileges granted by the European sovereigns from 
the time of the 15th century” and these “privileges were expressly limited to a 
specific territory under the control of the sovereign.”6 It is noteworthy that these 
privileges have historically been regarded as instruments of “public policy 
regulation to control and monitor particular industries.”7 In other words, these 
privileges were utilised by sovereigns to achieve specific societal goals within 
their territories.8 
The international intellectual property system evolved in response to the 
principle of territoriality. As a result of increased cross-border trade, states began 
to enter into bilateral treaties to protect intellectual property rights of their 
citizens abroad9 and this process eventually led to the emergence of two 
multilateral treaties on intellectual property towards the end of the nineteenth 
century i.e. the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris 
Convention) of 1883, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (Berne Convention) of 1886.10  
While both the Paris and Berne Conventions are the first multilateral 
treaties on intellectual property rights, they still preserved the principle of 
territoriality and member states were largely permitted to design their national 
intellectual property laws in a manner that suits their needs and interests as long 
                                                 
6  Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
7  Ibid., p. 73. 
8  See, Chris Dent, “‘Generally Inconvenient’: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political 
Compromise” (2009) 33(2) Melbourne University Law Review 415-453, p. 418. 
9  Lundstedt, supra n. 2, p. 85. 
10  Peter Drahos, “Intellectual Property and Human Rights” (1999) 3 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 349-371, pp. 351-358 (tracing the history of the international intellectual property 
system). 
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as the principle of national treatment is respected.11 Subsequently, towards the 
end of the twentieth century, intellectual property was incorporated into the 
international trade law system via the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) of 1994. Unlike the 
Paris and Berne Conventions, the TRIPS Agreement significantly encroaches 
upon the principle of territoriality as it contains certain minimum standards that 
member states are required to implement at the national level. Nevertheless, the 
TRIPS Agreement still accords some level of recognition to the principle of 
territoriality12 as it contains a number of flexibilities that allow countries to 
calibrate their national intellectual property laws to their level of technological 
and economic development.13 
Thus, in spite of globalisation and the ease with which products protected 
by intellectual property rights can cross national borders as a result of 
technological advancements, the principle of territoriality is still an integral 
component of IIPL. This implies that there is a continuing tension between the 
desire and drive (typically from multinational corporate actors trying to secure 
their intellectual property rights in several countries) for uniform/harmonised 
intellectual property standards on the one hand, and the desire and demand of 
several states to tailor their national intellectual property laws to suit their 
technological and economic needs on the other hand. Commenting on the 
continuing relevance of the principle of territoriality in the context of intellectual 
property law, Kur and Dreier note that, 
                                                 
11  The principle of national treatment is enshrined in the Paris Convention art. 3, the Berne 
Convention art. 5, and the TRIPS Agreement art. 3. 
12  See for instance the TRIPS Agreement art. 1(1). See also, Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy Frankel, 
“From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is Reconceptualizing 
Intellectual Property” (2014) 36(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 557-602, p. 565. 
13  See the objectives and principles contained in the TRIPS Agreement arts. 7 and 8. See also 
the WTO’s Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 2001. 
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The reason for the still prevailing emphasis of the principle of territoriality 
may be explained by political reasons…Today, when most states are under 
an obligation to recognize at least some sort of IP protection, the issue has 
become one of fine-tuning a state’s national legislation to that state’s 
particular economic, innovative, creative and consumptive needs. In other 
words, the principle of territoriality enables nation states to exercise an – 
albeit limited – freedom to adjust their IP policies and following their 
national IP laws to their particular national needs. These needs greatly differ 
between industrialised, newly industrialised or threshold countries and 
developing countries, between net exporters and net importers of IP-related 
goods and services.14 
However, while it is true that the principle of territoriality has managed 
to survive the incorporation of intellectual property into the international trade 
law system (albeit in an attenuated form), some scholars have expressed concern 
that the incorporation of intellectual property into the international investment 
law system via investment agreements (such as bilateral investment treaties and 
investment chapters of free trade agreements) constitutes a potential threat to the 
principle of territoriality in the international intellectual property system.15 The 
                                                 
14  Annette Kur and Thomas Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(Edward Elgar, 2013), p. 13. (Footnote omitted.) See also, Justine Pila and Paul Torremans, 
European Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 30. 
15  Peter Drahos, “BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property” (2001) 4(6) Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 791-808; Cynthia Ho, “Sovereignty under Siege: Corporate 
Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions” (2015) 30(1) Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 213-304; Dreyfuss and Frankel, “From Incentive to Commodity to Asset”, supra n. 12; 
Susy Frankel, “Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and Intellectual 
Property Law” (2016) 19(1) Journal of International Economic Law 121-143. It should be stressed 
that bilateral investment treaties are not a recent phenomenon. The first bilateral investment 
treaty was signed between West Germany and Pakistan in 1959. (See, Treaty for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (Germany-Pakistan), (25 November 1959) 457 
UNTS 6575). What is new in this regard is the use of the ISDS system by investors to 
challenge intellectual property laws before investment tribunals. See, Peter Yu, “The 
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incorporation of intellectual property rights into investment agreements as 
investment assets has been aptly termed the ”assetization” of intellectual 
property by Dreyfuss and Frankel.16 
The incorporation of intellectual property into the international 
investment law system and the assetization of intellectual property can affect the 
principle of territoriality in at least two ways. Firstly, free trade agreements 
(especially where it is an agreement between a developed country and a 
developing country) typically include provisions requiring the parties to 
implement standards that are above and beyond the minimum requirements of 
the TRIPS Agreements or which eliminates a flexibility available to a WTO 
member under the TRIPS Agreement (typically referred to as TRIPS-plus 
provisions).17 Where an agreement expressly contains such TRIPS-plus 
provisions, it can curtail the ability of a party to design its national intellectual 
property laws in a manner that allows it to achieve specific societal goals.18  It is 
however possible to incorporate specific provisions into a bilateral investment 
treaty or a free trade agreement that recognises a country’s policy space and 
preserves its regulatory powers with regard to intellectual property.19 
                                                 
Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (2017) 66(3) American University 
Law Review 829-910, pp. 837-844. 
16  Dreyfuss and Frankel, “From Incentive to Commodity to Asset”, supra n. 12, p. 571. 
17  See, Drahos, “BITS and BIPS”, supra n. 15, p. 793. See also, Henning Gross Ruse-Khan, 
“Protecting Intellectual Property Rights under BITs, FTAs and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes 
or Mutual Coherence?” in Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds.), Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP, 2011), p. 490. 
18  See, Drahos, “BITS and BIPS”, supra n. 15, p. 803. See also Ruse-Khan, “Protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights”, supra n. 17, pp. 490-491. 
19  For instance, the Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between 
Morocco and Nigeria, (3 December 2016), art. 8(8) states that Article 8 dealing with 
expropriation and compensation “does not apply to the issuance of a compulsory licence 
granted in relation to intellectual property rights or to the revocation, limitation or creation 
of an intellectual property right, to the extent that the issuance, revocation, limitation or 
creation is consistent with the WTO Agreement.” It should however be noted that these 
types of clauses may not necessarily prevent an investor from challenging a measure relating 
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Secondly, a number of these investment agreements empower 
corporations to challenge regulatory measures (implemented by host countries 
to achieve specific societal goals) before international arbitration tribunals via the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system.20 The threat and/or cost of 
litigation before an investment tribunal pursuant to an investment agreement can 
influence a country to decide not to implement certain regulatory measures 
(including measures relating to intellectual property rights)21 thus having a 
chilling effect on the regulatory powers of the country.22  
This paper focuses on this second effect and it will assess the extent to 
which there is still scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality 
within the framework of the ISDS system. This assessment is necessary because 
a number of countries have recently had to defend specific aspects of their 
national intellectual property laws before investment tribunals.23 There have 
been two decisions on substantive issues in this regard by investment tribunals 
                                                 
to intellectual property on the grounds that the measure is not consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement. See generally, Ruse-Khan, “Protecting Intellectual Property Rights”, supra n. 17, 
pp. 504-508. Crucially, Article 1110(7) of NAFTA did not prevent Eli Lilly from challenging 
Canada’s patent law before an investment tribunal. 
20  See, Ho, “Sovereignty under Siege”, supra n. 15, p. 219; Cynthia Ho, “A Collision Course 
between TRIPS Flexibilities and Investor-State Proceedings” (2016) 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review 
101-175; James Gathii and Cynthia Ho, “Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement 
from the WTO to the International Investment Regime” (2017) 18(2) Minnesota Journal of Law, 
Science & Technology 427-515. 
21  See for instance Sarah Roache, Lawrence Gostin, and Eduardo Fonsalia, “Trade, Investment, 
and Tobacco: Philip Morris v Uruguay” (2016) 316(20) Journal of the American Medical 
Association 2085-2086, p. 2086 (noting that, “Canada announced its intention to consider 
plain packaging [of tobacco products] as early as 1995 but was deterred by a legal opinion by 
Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds stating the proposed legislation would expropriate the 
companies’ trademarks, requiring hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement. This concern delayed plain packaging 
legislation, which Canada is now considering more than 20 years later.”). 
22  Ho, “Sovereignty under Siege”, supra n. 15, p. 233. 
23  See, Philip Morris Asia Limited v Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12 (Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) (17 December 2015); Philip Morris Brands Sarl & Others v Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/7, (Award) (8 July 2016) (hereinafter Philip Morris); Eli Lilly v Canada, Case No. 
UNCT/14/2, (Final Award) (16 March 2017) (hereinafter Eli Lilly). 
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and these two cases24 will be used to assess the extent of the preservation of the 
principle of territoriality in the ISDS system.25 
The first case is the dispute between Philip Morris and Uruguay which 
concerned the latter’s implementation of certain measures to curb the 
consumption of tobacco products in its country but which Philip Morris 
construed as an expropriation of its trademarks.26 The second case is the dispute 
between Eli Lilly and Canada which concerned the interpretation of the utility 
requirement under Canadian patent law.27 
This paper is structured into three main parts. Part two will examine the 
impact of the assetization of intellectual property and the ISDS system on the 
principle of territoriality. Parts three and four will attempt to determine whether 
there is still scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality within the 
ISDS system by examining the decisions of the investment tribunals in the 
dispute between Philip Morris and Uruguay (in part three) and the dispute 
between Eli Lilly and Canada (in part four). 
 
2 The principle of territoriality, the assetization of 
intellectual property, and the ISDS system 
 
As noted in the introduction above, assetization of intellectual property is the 
incorporation of intellectual property rights as investment assets into bilateral 
investment treaties and investment chapters of free trade agreements. As the 
                                                 
24  Philip Morris, supra n. 23; Eli Lilly, supra n. 23. 
25  A third case (Philip Morris Asia Limited v Australia, supra n. 23) was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction and will thus not be examined in this paper. 
26   Philip Morris, supra n. 23. 
27  Eli Lilly, supra n. 23. 
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assetization of intellectual property can enable corporate actors to challenge 
national intellectual property laws before investment tribunals via the ISDS 
system, scholars have highlighted the impact that assetization can have on the 
principle of territoriality in IIPL.28 There are a number of ways in which the 
assetization of intellectual property and the ISDS system can negatively impact 
the principle of territoriality in IIPL. It should be noted that there are other 
problems with the ISDS system29 and there have been calls from some quarters 
for the reform of the ISDS system as a whole.30 Indeed, in response to criticisms 
of the current ISDS system, the EU and Canada have recently jointly called for 
the establishment of a multilateral investment court.31 However, this paper only 
focuses on the aspects of the existing ISDS system that can negatively affect the 
principle of territoriality in IIPL and two of these are discussed below. 
Firstly, as Frankel points out, there is an incongruence between the object 
and purpose of protecting intellectual property and the object and purpose of 
                                                 
28  See, Dreyfuss and Frankel, “From Incentive to Commodity to Asset”, supra n. 12, p.571 
(noting that, “once assetization is realized through successive negotiations over IP, 
investment treaties and investment chapters in free trade agreements become significant for 
lurking within them are provisions defining IP as assets and a mechanism–investor-state 
arbitration–that protects these assets from direct or indirect expropriation and guarantees 
investors fair and equitable treatment.”). 
29  The ISDS system has been criticised for the lack of consistency in the decisions generated via 
the system as it has neither binding precedents nor an appellate system. In addition, it has 
also been criticised for its lack of transparency and its potential to produce decisions that 
might be inconsistent with other international dispute settlement systems such as the WTO 
dispute settlement system. See generally, Ho, “Sovereignty under Siege”, supra n. 15, 
pp. 234, 250. 
30  Anthea Roberts, “The Shifting Landscape of Investor-State Arbitration: Loyalists, Reformists, 
Revolutionaries and Undecideds” (EJIL: Talk!, 15 June 2017), available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-shifting-landscape-of-investor-state-arbitration-loyalists-
reformists-revolutionaries-and-undecideds/ (accessed 3 August 2017). 
31  See, Council of the European Union, “Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its 
Member States” 13541/16 (27 October 2016) available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13541-2016-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 3 
August 2017). See also, supra n. 30. 
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protecting investment assets.32 While intellectual property laws are typically 
rationalised as instruments for incentivising creativity, investment agreements 
are aimed at protecting an investor’s assets with the expectation of gain or 
profit.33 In addition, while intellectual property rights are typically not absolute 
rights and the impairment of an intellectual property right either through 
governmental regulation or third party use might be permissible if it falls within 
one of the limitations and exceptions to such rights under national laws, the rules 
for determining what constitutes an expropriation of an investment asset 
pursuant to an investment agreement may not necessarily overlap with the rules 
for determining what constitutes a permissible impairment of an intellectual 
property right.34 In other words, a governmental regulation or measure that 
could be considered a permissible limitation of an intellectual property right 
under a country’s national intellectual property laws could be characterised by 
an investor as an expropriation of its investment asset pursuant to an investment 
agreement. This incongruence between the object and purpose of intellectual 
property law and international investment law might impair the ability of a state 
to design its national intellectual property laws in a way that enables it to achieve 
specific societal goals. 
Secondly, the ability of investment tribunals to consider the broader 
public interest when resolving investment disputes has also been called into 
question.35 Frankel contends that “there is scant evidence that many investment 
                                                 
32  See generally, Frankel, “Interpreting the Overlap”, supra n. 15, p. 139 (noting that, “At its 
bluntest, the objects and purposes of international IP … and the object and purpose of 
investment agreements are not the same.”). 
33  Dreyfuss and Frankel, “From Incentive to Commodity to Asset”, supra n. 12, p. 572. 
34  Ibid. 
35  See, Kate Miles, “Reconceptualising International Investment Law: Bringing the Public 
Interest into Private Business” in Meredith Lewis and Susy Frankel (eds.), International 
Economic Law and National Autonomy (CUP, 2010), p. 295 (noting that, “Matters of public 
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tribunals take into account values which might be described as public goods or 
interests outside of the litigating parties.”36 This has serious implications for 
investment disputes involving intellectual property rights as a country may 
decide, in the public interest, to introduce specific measures relating to 
intellectual property rights in a bid to achieve specific societal goals such as 
protecting public health. 
In determining whether there is still scope for the preservation of the 
principle of territoriality in IIPL within the ISDS system, the two issues identified 
above will be used as a metric to critically assess the decisions of the tribunals in 
Philip Morris and Eli Lilly in parts three and four respectively. In other words, 
how did these tribunals deal with the incongruence between the object and 
purpose of protecting intellectual property and the object and purpose of 
protecting investment assets? Did these tribunals give any weight to public 
interest considerations in their decisions? 
3 Philip Morris v Uruguay 
In order to reduce the consumption of tobacco products in its country, the 
Uruguay government implemented a number of measures including the “single 
presentation requirement” (SPR)37 and the “80/80” regulation.38 The SPR permits 
the sale of only one variant of cigarette per brand family i.e. it prohibits the sale 
of more than one variant of the same brand of cigarette. The 80/80 regulation 
requires health warnings on 80% of both sides of cigarette packs, leaving only 
                                                 
interest are inherently involved in investor-state disputes. And yet, the current arbitration 
model is ill-equipped to address these wider issues.”). 
36  Frankel, “Interpreting the Overlap”, supra n. 15, p. 125. 
37  The SPR was implemented via Ordinance 514 of 18 August 2008 of the Uruguayan Ministry 
of Public Health. 
38  The 80/80 regulation was implemented via Presidential Decree No. 287/009 of 15 June 2009. 
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20% for trademarks, logos and other information. As a result of these measures, 
Philip Morris sued Uruguay before an investment tribunal pursuant to a bilateral 
investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay.39  
Philip Morris alleged, among other things, that the two measures 
constitute an expropriation of its trademarks pursuant to Article 5 of the bilateral 
investment treaty.40 According to Philip Morris, the SPR effectively banned and 
expropriated seven of its thirteen brand variants and the 80/80 regulation 
diminished the value of the remaining variants.41 Uruguay however contended 
that the measures were a legitimate exercise of its sovereign police power (i.e. 
regulatory power)42 and the measures were adopted solely for the purpose of 
protecting public health and not interference with foreign investment.43 
According to Uruguay, the SPR was adopted to reduce the negative 
consequences of the promotion of tobacco such as the false marketing by the 
claimants that certain brand variants are safer than other brand variants.44 In 
addition, Uruguay contended that the 80/80 regulation was adopted to heighten 
the awareness of consumers about the health risks associated with the 
consumption of tobacco and to encourage its citizens, including young people, to 
stop or not start smoking tobacco.45  
Uruguay also contended that Article 5 of the bilateral investment treaty 
should be interpreted in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties which permits a tribunal to consider customary international 
                                                 
39  See, Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments of October 1988 which entered into 
force in April 1991. 
40  Philip Morris, supra n. 23, para. 12. 
41  Ibid., paras. 180, 193-194. 
42  Ibid., para. 181. 
43  Ibid., para. 13. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid. 
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law in its interpretation of a treaty.46 According to Uruguay, “the police powers 
doctrine is a fundamental rule of customary international law and as such, it 
must be applied to interpret Article 5, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.”47 In this regard, Philip Morris contended, 
among other things, that a state’s regulatory measure must be subject to 
limitations and that, even if the measures were adopted to protect public health, 
they were still expropriatory because they were unreasonable.48 
In its decision, the tribunal ruled in favour of Uruguay (although there 
was a dissenting judgment from one of the arbitrators).49 As this was not a case 
involving the direct expropriation of an investment asset, a key question for the 
tribunal was whether the measures implemented by Uruguay were an indirect 
expropriation of the claimants’ asset.50 According to the tribunal, in order to 
constitute indirect expropriation, “the government’s measures interference with 
the investor’s rights must have a major adverse impact on the Claimants’ 
investments.”51 The tribunal ruled that there was no indirect expropriation and 
that the measures implemented by Uruguay were a valid exercise of state police 
powers to protect public health.52 As noted in part two above, the two issues 
                                                 
46  See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 art. 31(3)(c). 
47  Philip Morris, supra n. 23, para. 218. 
48  Ibid., para. 198. 
49  See, Ibid., para. 2. (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Mr Gary Born.) It should be noted 
that Mr Born dissented on two issues although he agreed with almost all of the conclusions 
in the tribunal’s award. Importantly, he agreed that the measures implemented by Uruguay 
were not expropriatory. He however disagreed with the majority with regard to whether 
there was a denial of justice and a denial of fair and equitable treatment. A thorough 
discussion of Mr Born’s dissenting opinion is however not within the scope of this article. 
50  The tribunal noted, “that the legal title to the property representing the Claimants’ 
investment was not affected by the Challenged Measures…Clearly, the Claimants’ claim 
relates to indirect or de facto expropriation, as shown by the reference to this kind of 
expropriation in their pleadings.” Ibid., para. 191. 
51  Ibid., para. 192. 
52  Ibid., paras. 272-307. 
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identified in part two will be used as a metric to determine whether the tribunal’s 
decision indicates that there is any scope for the preservation of the principle of 
territoriality within the ISDS system. 
3.1 The incongruence resulting from treating trademarks as both an 
investment asset and as an intellectual property right 
In relation to the first issue i.e. the incongruence between the object and purpose 
of protecting intellectual property and the object and purpose of protecting 
investment assets, the tribunal’s approach to the interpretation of the nature of 
the rights conferred on Philip Morris by virtue of its trademarks is highly 
instructive. In this case, the trademarks (which Philip Morris claimed had been 
expropriated as a result of the measures implemented by Uruguay) were both 
simultaneously intellectual property rights and investment assets.53 One crucial 
question that the tribunal had to answer in this regard was whether Philip 
Morris’ trademarks were capable of being expropriated. Philip Morris contended 
that it had the “right to use” its trademarks in commerce and thus it could be 
expropriated while Uruguay contended that trademark owners only have a 
negative “right to exclude” third parties from using their trademarks and not an 
affirmative “right to use” them.54 According to Uruguay, Philip Morris had no 
rights that could be expropriated since trademarks only confer a negative right 
to exclude.55 
In deciding this issue, the tribunal looked beyond the bilateral investment 
treaty and considered the nature of the right conferred on trademark owners 
                                                 
53  As noted by the tribunal, “It is undisputed that trademarks and goodwill associated with the 
use of trademarks are protected investments under Article 1(2)(d) of the BIT.” Ibid., para. 
235. Elsewhere, the tribunal referred to the trademarks as “intellectual property assets.” Ibid., 
para. 273. 
54  Ibid., paras. 168, 181. 
55  Ibid., para. 181. 
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under international trademark law i.e. the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement. This approach suggests that the tribunal was cognisant of the unique 
status of intellectual property as an investment asset. According to the tribunal, 
there is nothing in either the Paris Convention or the TRIPS Agreement that 
confers on trademark owners a positive right to use their trademarks.56 The 
tribunal noted that Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement only provides for the 
exclusive right of a trademark owner to prevent third parties from using the same 
trademark in the course of trade.57 The tribunal’s analysis did not however stop 
here. In the tribunal’s view, rather than frame the issue as one between a right to 
use and a right to exclude third parties, it is better to frame the issue as a choice 
between an absolute versus exclusive right to use.58 According to the tribunal:  
Ownership of a trademark does, in certain circumstances, grant a right to use 
it. It is a right of use that exists vis-à-vis other persons, an exclusive right, but 
a relative one. It is not an absolute right to use that can be asserted against 
the State qua regulator.59 
Thus, while recognising that there is no provision under international 
trademark law that expressly confers a right to use a trademark on the owner, 
the tribunal adopted the view that the ownership of a trademark could in certain 
cases confer a right to use it. It should be noted that there is a divergence of 
opinion on this issue amongst scholars. Some scholars hold to the view, 
canvassed by Uruguay in this case, that trademark owners only have a negative 
right to exclude third parties from using their trademarks.60 Other scholars such 
                                                 
56  Ibid., paras. 260-262. 
57  Ibid., para. 262. 
58  Ibid., para. 267. 
59  Ibid. 
60  See generally, Andrew Mitchell, “Australia’s Move to the Plain Packaging of Cigarettes and 
its WTO Compatibility” (2010) 5(2) Asian Journal of WTO Law and International Health Law and 
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as Frankel and Gervais however hold a contrary view and contend that “there is 
a leap in logic from saying that because Article 16 frames certain rights as 
exclusive rights against infringement (negative rights), therefore trademark 
owners have no rights to use (positive rights).”61 They further contend that 
trademarks are not registered solely to obtain a government certificate but people 
“register them because they are using the trademark in commerce (or intend 
to).”62 They equally point out that, embedded in Article 17 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, is a recognition of the legitimate interests of trademark owners.63 In 
other words, Article 17 seems to go beyond a mere right to exclude as it provides 
that the “legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark” must be taken into 
account when members provide limited exceptions to trademark rights. Frankel 
and Gervais refer to a decision of a WTO dispute settlement panel in European 
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs where the panel stated that: 
Every trademark owner has a legitimate interest in preserving the 
distinctiveness, or capacity to distinguish, of its trademark so that it can 
perform that function. This includes its interest in using its own trademark 
                                                 
Policy 405-426, pp. 415-416. Mitchell also relies on the ruling of the WTO Panel in European 
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs (15 March 2005) WT/DS174/R, para. 7.210, where the Panel stated that the TRIPS 
Agreement “does not generally provide for the grant of positive rights to exploit or use 
certain subject matter, but rather provides for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain 
acts.” Other scholars who hold this view include: Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Assessing 
the Need for a General Public Interest Exception in the TRIPS Agreement” in Annette Kur 
(ed.), Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System: Proposals for Reform of TRIPS 
(Edward Elgar, 2011), p. 197; Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell, “Implications of WTO Law 
for Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products” in Tania Voon et al. (eds.), Public Health and Plain 
Packaging of Cigarettes: Legal Issues (Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 115-119.  
61  See, Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais, “Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement” (2013) 46(5) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1149-1214, p. 1188. 
62  Ibid., p. 1212. 
63  Ibid. 
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in connection with the relevant goods and services of its own and authorized 
undertakings.64 
It will thus appear that even though there is no express provision in the 
TRIPS Agreement conferring a right to use on trademark owners, this does not 
mean that trademark owners do not have a legitimate interest in using their 
trademarks in commerce. The tribunal however did not deem it necessary to 
consider whether trademark owners have a legitimate interest in using their 
trademarks.65 Nevertheless, the tribunal concluded its analysis on this question 
by ruling that: 
…under Uruguayan law or international conventions to which Uruguay is a 
party the trademark holder does not enjoy an absolute right of use, free of 
regulation, but only an exclusive right to exclude third parties from the 
market so that only the trademark holder has the possibility to use the 
trademark in commerce, subject to the State’s regulatory power.66 
Thus, the crucial point to note here is that trademarks are not absolute 
rights and they are subject to the state’s regulatory power. In other words, despite 
the dual nature of the trademarks involved in this dispute (i.e. as both intellectual 
property and investment assets), the tribunal still recognised the unique status of 
intellectual property rights in the context of investment agreements. The 
approach of the tribunal in this regard is in line with the object and purpose of 
the TRIPS Agreement which provides in Article 8 that, in formulating or 
amending their national intellectual property laws, countries can adopt measures 
                                                 
64  WTO, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (15 March 2005) WT/DS174/R, para. 7.664. 
65  See, Philip Morris, supra n. 23, para. 271, footnote 346. 
66  Ibid., para. 271. 
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necessary to protect public health and nutrition. As the tribunal pointed out in 
its analysis, “if a food additive is, subsequent to the grant of a trademark, shown 
to cause cancer, it must be possible for the government to legislate so as to 
prevent or control its sale notwithstanding the trademark.”67 Consequently, 
simply because a trademark is an investment asset, it does not mean that it 
therefore becomes immune from a state’s regulatory power. The approach of the 
tribunal in this regard thus accords with, and preserves, the principle of 
territoriality. 
3.2 The public interest 
In relation to the second issue i.e. the ability of investment tribunals to consider 
the broader public interest when resolving investment disputes, the approach of 
the tribunal in this regard appears to be contrary to the view that “there is scant 
evidence that many investment tribunals take into account values which might 
be described as public goods or interests outside of the litigating parties.”68 The 
approach of the tribunal with regard to considering the broader public interest 
can be discerned in its analysis of the question concerning whether the measures 
introduced by Uruguay expropriated Philip Morris’ investment. 
According to the tribunal, the 80/80 regulation did not constitute an 
indirect expropriation and it held that a “limitation to 20% of the space available 
to such purpose could not have a substantial effect on the Claimants’ business 
since it consisted only in a limitation imposed by the law on the modalities of use 
of the relevant trademarks.”69 The tribunal also stated that the SPR did not 
substantially deprive the claimants of the value, use or enjoyment of their 
                                                 
67  Ibid., para. 269. 
68  Frankel, “Interpreting the Overlap”, supra n. 15, p. 125. 
69  Philip Morris, supra n. 23, para. 276. 
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investments.70 The tribunal took note of the fact that Philip Morris admitted this 
much when they mentioned that “while Abal [one of the claimant companies 
owned by Philip Morris] has grown more profitable since 2011, Abal would have 
been even more profitable if Respondent has not adopted the challenged 
measures.”71 The tribunal took the view that: 
…in respect of a claim based on indirect expropriation, as long as sufficient 
value remains after the Challenged Measures are implemented, there is no 
expropriation. As confirmed by investment treaty decisions, a partial loss of 
the profits that the investment would have yielded absent the measure does 
not confer an expropriatory character on the measure.72 
Apart from holding that the measures implemented by Uruguay did not 
constitute an expropriation of the trademarks, the tribunal further held that the 
adoption of the measures was a valid exercise of Uruguay’s police powers.73 The 
tribunal’s analysis with regard to the police powers doctrine offers an interesting 
insight into its approach towards considering the public interest. The tribunal 
took the view that Article 5 of the bilateral investment treatment (which deals 
with expropriation) must be interpreted in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which permits reference to customary 
international law. Relying on this approach, the tribunal noted that “protecting 
public health has since long been recognized as an essential manifestation of the 
State’s police power.”74 
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71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid., para. 286. 
73  Ibid., para. 287. 
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The tribunal traced the historical development of the police powers 
doctrine in international investment law and it noted that, while it was not 
initially recognised by tribunals, “a consistent trend in favour of differentiating 
the exercise of police powers from indirect expropriation emerged after 2000.”75 
As noted by Pellet, the police powers doctrine or the state’s right to regulate 
“accepts that a non-discriminatory taking of property without compensation can 
be lawful, if decided for a reason of public interest” and “its purpose is to 
preserve the right of the State to regulate in the public interest.”76  
Instructively, the tribunal “stressed that the SPR and the 80/80 Regulation 
have been adopted in fulfilment of Uruguay’s national and international legal 
obligations for the protection of public health.”77 The tribunal took note of the 
fact that Uruguay had obligations both under its national constitution and the 
WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) to protect its citizens 
from the harmful effects of tobacco.78 Importantly, the tribunal even incorporated 
a human rights perspective into its decision by noting that the  “FCTC is one of 
the international conventions to which Uruguay is a party guaranteeing the 
human rights to health; it is of particular relevance in the present case, being 
                                                 
75  Ibid., para. 295. In this regard the tribunal referred to the following cases: Tecmed v Mexico (29 
May 2003) ARB (AF)/00/2 (Award); Methanex v United States (3 August 2005) (Final Award); 
Saluka v Czech Republic (17 March 2006) (Partial Award); Chemtura v Canada (2 August 2010) 
Award. 
76  Alain Pellet, “Police Powers or the State’s Right to Regulate: Chemtura v. Canada” in Meg 
Kinnear et al. (eds.), Building International Investment Law – The First 50 Years of ICSID 
(Kluwer Law International, 2015), p. 449. See also, Aikaterini Titi, The Right to Regulate in 
International Investment Law, (Nomos, 2014); Kate Mitchell, “Philip Morris v Uruguay: An 
Affirmation of ‘Police Powers’ and ‘Regulatory Power in the Public Interest’ in International 
Investment Law” (EJIL: Talk!, 28 July 2016), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/philip-
morris-v-uruguay-an-affirmation-of-police-powers-and-regulatory-power-in-the-public-
interest-in-international-investment-law/ (accessed 3 August 2017). 
77  Philip Morris, supra n. 23, para. 302. 
78  Ibid., paras. 302-304. 
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specifically concerned to regulate tobacco control.”79 The tribunal took the view 
that the SPR and the 80/80 regulation satisfied the conditions that must be 
fulfilled for a state’s exercise of its regulatory powers not to constitute indirect 
expropriation i.e. it was taken bona fide to protect the public welfare (specifically 
public health in this case), it was non-discriminatory, and it was proportionate.80 
The tribunal’s approach to the question of whether the measures 
implemented by Uruguay constitute an expropriation of Philip Morris’ 
investments and its invocation of the police powers doctrine demonstrates that 
there is still some scope and hope for the preservation of the principle of 
territoriality within the ISDS system. This is important because even under the 
TRIPS Agreement, pursuant to Articles 8 and 20, countries are permitted to 
introduce measures to regulate the use of trademarks in order to protect the 
public health.81 
4 Eli Lilly v Canada 
This case centres around the invalidation between 2010 and 2011, of two 
pharmaceutical patents (on two drugs, Strattera and Zyprexa) belonging to Eli 
Lilly by Canadian courts based on a failure to satisfy Canada’s utility 
requirement.82 Eli Lilly alleged that this was an expropriation pursuant to the 
                                                 
79  Ibid., para. 304. 
80  Ibid., paras. 305-306. 
81  Supra n. 61. There is currently a dispute at the WTO concerning Australia’s tobacco plain 
packaging laws and a decision is expected shortly. See, Australia – Certain Measures 
Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements 
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In order to fully understand 
Eli Lilly’s complaint in this regard, it is necessary to provide some background 
on Canada’s utility requirement.  
According to section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act, an invention “means 
any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter.” Section 27(3)(a) of the Act further provides that the 
specification of an invention must “correctly and fully describe the invention and 
its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor.” Thus, similar to the 
situation in most countries, under Canadian patent law, an invention must satisfy 
the utility requirement. What is however unique about the Canadian utility 
requirement is the yardstick that Canadian courts developed over time to 
determine what satisfies the utility requirement. The Canadian Federal Courts 
developed the “promise of the patent” or “the promise doctrine” according to 
which if a patent application (construed as a whole) promises a specific utility, 
the invention would not satisfy the utility requirement unless that promise is 
fulfilled. As stated by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in Eli Lilly v 
Novopharm Ltd, 
Where the specification does not promise a specific result, no particular level 
of utility is required; a “mere scintilla” of utility will suffice. However, where 
the specification sets out an explicit “promise”, utility will be measured 
against that promise…The question is whether the invention does what the 
patent promises it will do.83 
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As developed by the Canadian courts, the promise of a patent is 
determined by examining the patent as a whole (including the claims and 
specification).84 After identifying the promises, the doctrine requires that these 
promises be fulfilled either by demonstration or sound prediction and it equates 
the fulfilment of these promises with the utility requirement in section 2 of the 
Patent Act.85 According to the doctrine, if any of the promises are not fulfilled, 
then the invention would be deemed to have failed to meet the utility 
requirement.86  
However, in June 2017, just a few months after the tribunal’s decision in 
the dispute between Eli Lilly and Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court held that 
the promise doctrine is unsound and that its interpretation of the utility 
requirement is incongruent with the words and scheme of the Patent Act.87 
Importantly, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine conflates the utility 
requirement (in section 2) with the disclosure requirement (in section 27(3)) of 
the Patent Act.88  
The merits or otherwise of the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision is 
however not the focus of this paper. It suffices to state here that, under the 
principle of territoriality in IIPL, a country is free to strengthen or weaken its 
patentability requirements and thus Canada (either through its parliament or 
courts) is free to change its mind about the promise doctrine. This paper is instead 
concerned with the question of whether the application of the promise doctrine 
prior to June 2017, resulting in the invalidation of a number of patents including 
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Eli Lilly’s pharmaceutical patents, constitutes an expropriation of Eli Lilly’s 
patent.  
The crux of Eli Lilly’s complaint was that Canadian courts developed the 
promise doctrine in the mid-2000s after it had been granted its patents and it 
contended that this was a radical development.89 Importantly, it also contended 
that the doctrine is inconsistent with Canada’s obligation under NAFTA and that 
the retroactive application of the doctrine to its patent amounted to, inter alia, an 
unlawful expropriation under Article 1110 of NAFTA.90 In response, Canada 
contended, among other things, that a national court decision could only breach 
NAFTA if there had been a denial of justice, that there had been no radical change 
in the way Canadian courts interpreted the utility requirement, and that the 
invalidation of Eli Lilly’s patent did not amount to a breach of its obligation 
under NAFTA or any other international obligation.91 
The tribunal ruled in favour of Canada and it held that Eli Lilly had failed 
to demonstrate that there had been a radical change in the way Canadian courts 
construed the utility requirement.92 The tribunal equally ruled that the 
invalidation of Eli Lilly’s patents was not a breach of Canada’s obligations under 
NAFTA and was therefore not an expropriation.93 However, the ruling of the 
tribunal appears to suggest that an investor can challenge the decisions of a 
country’s courts before an investment tribunal even where there has been no 
denial of justice.94 A critical discussion of the tribunal’s ruling in relation to denial 
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92  Ibid., para. 387. 
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94  While stressing that an investment tribunal is not an appellate tier in relation to national 
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of justice is however beyond the scope of this paper as the focus here is on the 
tribunal’s ruling on whether the invalidation of Eli Lilly’s patents amounted to 
an expropriation.95 As was done in part three above, the two issues identified in 
part two will be used as a metric to determine whether the tribunal’s decision 
indicates that there is any scope for the preservation of the principle of 
territoriality within the ISDS system. 
4.1 The incongruence resulting from treating patents as both an 
investment asset and as an intellectual property right 
In relation to the incongruence between the object and purpose of protecting 
inventions via the patent system and the object and purpose of protecting 
inventions as investment assets, the tribunal’s decision on three questions is quite 
instructive. The three questions relate to: (1) whether there had been a radical 
change in the way Canadian courts applied the utility doctrine; (2) whether Eli 
Lilly had a legitimate expectation that its patents would not be invalidated; and, 
(3) whether NAFTA or international patent law requires countries to have a 
uniform approach to defining the utility requirement. 
With regard to the first question, Eli Lilly alleged that the promise doctrine 
constitutes a radical change from the traditional utility standard which Canada 
had been applying prior to the adoption of the doctrine by Canadian courts in 
the mid-2000s and which is still being applied by other parties to NAFTA i.e. 
                                                 
blatant unfairness…As a matter of principle, therefore, having regard to the content of the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment, the Tribunal is unwilling to 
shut the door to the possibility that judicial conduct characterized other than as a denial of 
justice may engage a respondent’s obligations under NAFTA Article 1105…” See, ibid., para. 
223. 
95  For a critique of the tribunal’s ruling in relation to denial of justice see, Rob Howse, “Eli Lilly 
v Canada: A Pyrrhic Victory against Big Pharma” (International Economic Law and Policy 
Blog, 26 March 2017), available at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/03/eli-
lilly-v-canada-a-pyrrhic-victory-against-big-pharma-.html (accessed 3 August 2017). 
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USA and Mexico.96 In response, Canada contended that as the term “useful” is 
not defined in the Patent Act, its meaning has evolved through judicial 
jurisprudence and there was therefore no radical change in the law.97 In its ruling, 
the tribunal acknowledged that the process of the development of the doctrine 
shows that there had been some change but it ruled that the “change is more 
incremental and evolutionary than dramatic.”98 Essentially, the tribunal ruled 
that Eli Lilly “has not demonstrated a fundamental or dramatic change in 
Canadian patent law.”99 
The tribunal’s approach in this regard however raises the question of what 
would constitute a radical change in a country’s patent law that could be 
construed as an expropriation. The only reason that Eli Lilly failed in this regard 
was because it could not establish that there had been a radical change in 
Canadian patent law. But what if another company in a future case is able to 
establish that there had been a radical change?  The tribunal’s decision does not 
offer clear guidance on what kind of change can amount to a radical change and 
this can have a significant impact on a country’s regulatory power (and by 
implication, the principle of territoriality). There is nothing in the TRIPS 
Agreement or NAFTA that prevents a country’s court from adopting an 
interpretive approach that strengthens its patentability requirements in order to 
address legitimate concerns within the country such as the need to prevent 
speculative patenting. These developments, while they might appear to be 
“radical” changes to an investor, are well within the regulatory powers of a state 
under international patent law. The tribunal’s approach in this regard therefore 
appears to leave the door open for investors to challenge national court decisions 
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that they might view as constituting “radical” changes to previously existing 
standards. As Howse notes: 
On those exceptional but usually very important occasions when high courts 
reconsider well-established judicial doctrines in the face of social, economic, 
environmental or other forms of rapid change we experience in the world 
today they must now beware that any basic or fundamental reorientation of 
their jurisprudence could force that state’s government to pay out millions 
or even billions to foreign corporations in the guise of an “expropriation” 
having occurred.100 
It is suggested here that a preferable approach would have been for the 
tribunal to recognise a country’s regulatory power to change (either through its 
parliament or its courts) its patent laws to suit its needs and interests. As long as 
this change is in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Convention and the 
TRIPS Agreement, a country should not have to defend any change in its patent 
law before an investment tribunal. More importantly, the question should not 
have been whether or not there had been a radical change in Canada’s patent law 
but whether the alleged change in Canada’s utility requirement is in line with 
international patent law as codified in the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement. It is instructive to note that neither the Paris Convention nor the 
TRIPS Agreement (or even NAFTA for that matter) define the utility requirement 
thus giving countries the discretion to define what constitutes utility under their 
national patent laws. In other words, Canada is well within its rights to adopt a 
unique approach in its definition of what constitutes a useful invention under 
international patent law. 
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In relation to the second question i.e. whether Eli Lilly had a legitimate 
expectation that its patents would not be invalidated, Eli Lilly contended that it 
“reasonably relied upon the traditional utility requirement in Canadian patent 
law throughout the process of developing Zyprexa and Strattera, and continued 
to do so as it brought the drugs to market.”101 In addition, Eli Lilly argued that 
the grant of the patents constituted a commitment by Canada that Eli Lilly 
“would have exclusive rights to make, use and sell its invention until the expiry 
of the patents.”102 Eli Lilly drew a distinction between the “normal risk of 
invalidation” and the “unacceptable risk that a patent will be tested against a 
new patentability requirement that could not have been foreseen at the time the 
patent was granted.”103 
In response, Canada contended, inter alia, that the grant of a patent cannot 
be relied upon as a basis for legitimate expectation because patents are merely 
presumptively valid subject to challenge and final determination by courts.104 
Canada also argued that, when Eli Lilly applied for its patents, it should have 
known that, if its patent did not meet the patentability requirements, they could 
be invalidated and “that the legal meaning of patentability requirements is 
constantly being clarified and elaborated through court decisions.”105 In Canada’s 
view, the only legitimate expectation that Eli Lilly could have was to receive a 
fair hearing when its patents were challenged and it did receive one.106 
Importantly, Canada rejected Eli Lilly’s contention that there was a violation of 
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its legitimate expectations because of a dramatic change in the law and it stated 
that, 
[e]ven if such a change had occurred, it is trite to say that the common law 
evolves over time. Any sophisticated investor expects developments in the 
law, particularly in the area of patent law. It simply cannot be that every time 
a court overrules a precedent, it violates customary international law.107 
In its decision, the tribunal noted that Eli Lilly’s allegation of a violation 
of its legitimate expectation depended on establishing that there was a radical 
change in Canada’s utility requirement and, since Eli Lilly could not establish 
that there was a radical change, its allegation in this regard must be dismissed.108 
Nevertheless, the tribunal still noted that every patentee knows that their patents 
can be challenged before national courts on the grounds of a failure to satisfy 
patentability requirements.109 According to the tribunal, Eli Lilly’s expectation 
that its patents would not be invalidated for failure to meet the utility 
requirement “cannot amount to a legitimate expectation.”110 
The tribunal’s decision in this regard accords with the principle of 
territoriality. Patents, like other forms of intellectual property rights, can always 
be challenged before national courts and they can be invalidated for failure to 
satisfy the statutory requirements. International intellectual property law also 
gives countries the freedom to define patentability requirements and the grounds 
on which a patent can be invalidated in their national law. Simply because a 
patent is also an investment asset should not change the fact that the patent is 
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just presumptively valid. Thus, an investor cannot legitimately expect that its 
patents will not be invalidated by the courts. 
In relation to the third question i.e. whether NAFTA or international 
patent law requires countries to have a uniform approach to defining the utility 
requirement, Eli Lilly contended (in support of its allegation that there had been 
a radical change in Canada’s utility requirement) that Canada’s promise doctrine 
was an outlier when compared with the position in the other parties to NAFTA 
(i.e. USA and Mexico).111 Eli Lilly also alleged that Canada’s “promise utility 
doctrine constitutes a new and radical departure from the traditional patent law 
concept of utility as reflected in the laws of many countries.”112 In response, 
Canada contended, inter alia, that “any differences in patent law regimes across 
jurisdictions [are] irrelevant” because “international patent law is not 
harmonized by NAFTA or otherwise.” Furthermore, Canada stressed that no 
other country (apart from the United States Trade Representative in its 2014 and 
2015 Special 301 Reports) or international organisation had complained about its 
utility requirement.113 
In its decision on this question, the tribunal noted that the only complaint 
against Canada’s utility requirement was made by the United States Trade 
Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 reports of 2014 and 2015 and it stated that 
this “silence [from other countries, including Mexico] speaks louder than the 
single, brief criticism contained in the USTR’s Special 301 Report.”114 Essentially, 
the tribunal ruled that Eli Lilly’s comparison of Canada’s utility requirement 
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with that of other countries does not alter its findings that there had been no 
radical change in Canada’s utility requirement.115 
The tribunal’s decision in this regard accords with, and preserves, the 
principle of territoriality. Since there is no treaty that codifies the meaning of the 
utility requirement, countries are free to define this requirement as they so wish 
in their national patent laws. There is nothing in the Paris Convention, TRIPS 
Agreement, or NAFTA, that harmonises the patentability requirements. 
Crucially, the TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA only contain minimum (but not 
harmonised) standards in relation to patentability requirements.116 There is 
therefore nothing surprising about the fact that different countries might have 
different definitions with regard to patentability requirements. 
4.2 The public interest 
One of the contentions of Eli Lilly was that the promise doctrine is arbitrary 
because it, inter alia, served no legitimate public purpose.117 In Eli Lilly’s view, 
Canada had “failed to identify any credible policy objective advanced by the 
promise utility doctrine.”118 In response, Canada rejected the view that the 
doctrine is arbitrary and it contended, among other things, that some of the 
elements of the doctrine such as requiring patent applicants to demonstrate or 
soundly predict the utility of an invention at the time of filing is aimed at 
preventing the granting of patents on the basis of bare speculation.119 Canada 
equally contended that requiring patent applicants to disclose the basis of their 
                                                 
115  Ibid., para. 379. 
116  The TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA simply state that an invention must be useful/capable of 
industrial application without defining what this means. See, TRIPS Agreement, art. 27 and 
NAFTA, art. 1709. 
117  Eli Lilly, supra n. 23, para. 390. 
118  Ibid., para. 396. 
119  Ibid., para. 406. 
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sound predictions is not arbitrary but is rather “an essential part of the patent 
bargain.”120 Essentially, Canada contended that all the elements of the promise 
doctrine “serve important policy objectives.”121 
In its ruling in this regard, the tribunal noted that it was necessary to 
consider Eli Lilly’s allegation in this regard (despite finding that there was no 
radical change in Canada’s utility requirement) because an arbitrary or 
discriminatory measure can violate NAFTA even in the absence of a radical 
change in the law.122 However, it held that the decisions of the Canadian courts 
with regard to the promise doctrine were neither arbitrary nor expropriatory.123 
Importantly, the tribunal found that Canada had “asserted a legitimate public 
policy justification for the promise doctrine.”124 In particular, the tribunal noted 
that Canada had explained that holding patent applicants to the promises 
disclosed in their patents discourages overstatements in patent disclosure and is 
part of the patent bargain.125 Importantly, in relation to one of the elements of the 
promise doctrine which prevents patent applicants from submitting evidence to 
prove utility after the filing of an application, the tribunal stated that, while this 
might make it difficult for an applicant to identify when all the patentability 
requirements can be met and when to file its patent application, “this is the 
consequence of a rational policy approach in Canada, not an indication of 
arbitrariness in the law” and that it is not the tribunal’s role to question the policy 
choices of Canada.126 
                                                 
120  Ibid., para. 407. 
121  Ibid., para. 408. 
122  Ibid., para. 416. 
123  Ibid., para. 418. 
124  Ibid., para. 423. 
125  Ibid. 
126  Ibid., para. 426. 
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The tribunal’s deference to Canada’s policy choices in this regard is 
commendable. The approach of the tribunal in relation to this issue is also in 
accordance with the principle of territoriality in IIPL. It is important for 
investment tribunals to recognise and respect the policy choices that countries 
make (either through their parliament or courts) with regard to their patent laws 
specifically or intellectual property laws generally. International intellectual 
property law, especially the TRIPS Agreement, permits countries to adopt 
policies that are in the public interest and which are aimed at achieving specific 
societal goals such as preventing speculative patenting, prohibiting the patenting 
of trivial modifications of previously known medicines, or facilitating access to 
affordable generic drugs.127 
5 Conclusion 
This paper does not intend to make any radical suggestions for the reform of the 
ISDS system128 and neither does it pretend to have exhaustively examined all the 
potential ways in which the international investment law regime can impact the 
principle of territoriality in IIPL. For instance, investors typically rely on other 
concepts such as the denial of justice and the lack of fair and equitable treatment 
in support of their claims before investment tribunals. While these other concepts 
                                                 
127  See generally, TRIPS Agreement, arts. 1, 7, and 8 and WTO, Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health (20 November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.  
128  For some criticisms of and suggestions on how to reform the ISDS system, see generally, 
Sachet Singh and Soorai Sharma, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Quest 
for a Workable Roadmap” (2013) 29(76) Merkourios – Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law 88-101; Jan Kleinheisterkamp and Lauge Poulsen, “Investment Protection in 
TTIP: Three Feasible Proposals” in Marc Bugenberg et al. (eds.), European Yearbook of 
International Economic Law 2016 (Springer, 2016) pp. 527-541; Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs, 
“The Outsized Costs of Investor-State Dispute Settlement” (2016) 16(1) Academy of 
International Business Insights 10-13. For a response to criticisms of the ISDS system see, 
Gloria Alvarez et al., “A Response to the Criticism against ISDS by EFILA” (2016) 33(1) 
Journal of International Arbitration 1-36. 
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have not been thoroughly examined in this paper, this does not imply that they 
cannot have an impact on the principle of territoriality in IIPL. Furthermore, the 
cost of defending an investment dispute129 and the possibility of being ordered to 
pay a huge amount of money as compensation130 to an investor may deter states 
from implementing measures relating to intellectual property that can 
subsequently be challenged before an investment tribunal. 
This paper instead focuses on whether there is still some scope for the 
preservation of the principle of territoriality in the ISDS system by examining 
how investment tribunals have construed what constitutes an expropriation in 
two recent cases involving “intellectual property assets”. While one should be 
wary of jumping to conclusions based on the outcome of only two cases, these 
two cases provides some basis for cautious optimism. A critical examination of 
these two cases suggests that there is still some scope for the preservation of the 
principle of territoriality in the ISDS system although a lot depends on how a 
tribunal approaches the question of what amounts to an expropriation. A critical 
reading of the two cases discussed in this paper suggests that, if tribunals adopt 
a broad interpretive approach when construing bilateral investment treaties and 
investment chapters of free trade agreements in disputes involving “intellectual 
property assets,” they can arrive at decisions that preserve the regulatory powers 
                                                 
129  It should be noted that even though Uruguay won and Philip Morris lost, the tribunal only 
ordered Philip Morris to pay $7 million out of the $10.3 million that Uruguay claimed it 
spent on legal costs. In other words, Uruguay had to bear the cost of the remaining $3.3 
million. See, Philip Morris, supra n. 23, paras. 582-588. 
130  For instance, in its claim against Canada, Eli Lilly demanded for the sum of CDN $500 
million as compensation for the losses it claimed to have suffered as a result of Canada’s 
breach of its obligation under NAFTA. See, Eli Lilly (Notice of Arbitration) (12 September 
2013), para. 85. See also, Dreyfuss and Frankel, “From Incentive to Commodity to Asset”, 
supra n. 12, pp. 573-574. 
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of states whilst simultaneously preventing corporate actors from abusing and 
misusing a system designed to protect investors with genuine grievances.  
There is no rule of international law that prevents investment tribunals 
from adopting a broad interpretive approach when construing investment 
treaties. A broad interpretive approach will permit investment tribunals to 
incorporate relevant principles from other areas of international law such as 
international intellectual property law and international human rights law when 
deciding disputes between states and corporate actors. Furthermore, with the 
current legitimacy crisis confronting the ISDS system, the adoption of a broad 
interpretive approach that incorporates broader public interests and which 
respects the legitimate policy choices made by states will go a long way towards 
enhancing the credibility of investment tribunals as reliable and responsible 
dispute settlement forums. 
 
 
